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CALIFORNIA PUBLIC ENTITY IMMUNITY FROM TORT
CLAIMS BY PRISONERS
Prior to 1961, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a part of
the law of California.' In 1961, the doctrine was abruptly abrogated
by judicial decision.2 The reaction to this abrogation was the enact-
ment of the California Tort Claims Act.3 Within this Act, there is
granted to public entities an immunity from liability for injuries to
prisoners.4 The theory behind this immunity is that
no tort liability should be admitted for damages sustained as the con-
sequence of conditions which are common to all inmates and which
simply represent a reasonable application of general policy deter-
minations by responsible prison or jail authorities with respect to the
administration of such institutions.5
The immunity is intended to prevent a prisoner from recovering
from a public entity for injuries caused by its employees. This note
will seek to determine the extent to which the public entity is pro-
tected by this immunity. Additionally, the court decisions interpret-
ing the statutory exceptions will be examined to establish the need
and desirability of such an immunity.
Civil Death 6
Before examining this aspect of sovereign immunity, it is neces-
sary to determine the extent to which a prisoner is prevented from
bringing suit by the concept of civil death. If civil death is absolute
and irrevocable, the prisoner cannot sue and the immunity is un-
necessary. On the other hand, if civil death only affects certain
prisoners and is revocable,7 then the immunity has a serious effect on
1 Stanton, Sovereign Immunity, 38 CAL. S.B.J. 177 (1963). For a brief
history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity see Muskopf v. Corning Hosp.
Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 214-17, 359 P.2d 457, 458-60, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90-92 (1961).
2 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961); Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224,
359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
3 Claims and Actions Against Public Entities and Public Employees
(California Tort Claims Act), CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6. This Act was
enacted after a 2-year moratorium on the effect of the Muskopf and Lipman
cases as declared by Cal. Civ. Code § 22.3, Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1404, § 1, at
3209 (expired 1963), during which time a study was made on the need for
sovereign immunity: 5 CAL. LAw REVISION COMm'x, REPORTS, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS & STUDIES (1963).
4 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 844.6.
5 5 CAL. LAw REVIsIoN COMM'N, REPORTS, RIEcOMIENDATIONS & STUDIES
425 (1963).
6 Although the use of the term "Civil Death" is technically correct only
when referring to persons incarcerated in a state prison for life, CAL. PEN.
CODE § 2601, for the purposes of this note it will include all persons incar-
cerated in a state prison, due to the fact that the right to bring civil suit has
been suspended for prisoners with a sentence of less than life, CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 2600, as well as for those with life sentences. "Civil Death" is generally
used herein to mean that the prisoner is unable to bring civil suit.
7 CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 provides in part: "A sentence of imprisonment
[573)
a prisoner's right to bring suit.
It is customary for a prisoner to suffer a loss of rights.8 The courts
have recognized that a state has the power to cause such a loss
of rights, even to the extent of impinging upon a prisoner's con-
stitutionally guaranteed rights.9 This impingement is within the
power of the state legislature as long as its purpose is to guarantee
the proper maintenance, operation and security of the prison.1 In
California, the loss of rights includes a statutory pronouncement of
civil death upon imprisonment in a state prison.i: The civil death
statutes 12 are applicable to felonsis only, not to persons incarcerated
in city or county jails.
The California courts have held that civil death prohibits a
felon from instigating civil actions.' 4 However, the Tort Claims
Act has tempered the effect of civil death by extending the statute
of limitations on a prisoner's cause of action for 6 months beyond the
termination of civil death.15 This extension is allowed only when
proper steps have been taken within the normal statute of limita-
tions.' 6 The effect of the extension is to permit all prisoners in Cali-
fornia to bring civil suit once their civil death, if any, has terminated.
Therefore, a prisoner's right to recover against the public entity is
determined by the immunity created by law.
Section 844.6'"
The principal effect of the California Tort Claims Act is to cause
public entities to be generally liable for the torts of their employees.' 8
The Act imposes liability upon the public entity under the doctrine
of respondeat superior unless there is a statute creating an im-
munity for the entity or its employees.' 9 Section 844.6 (a) of the
in a state prison for any term less than life suspends all the civil rights of
the person so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts,
authority, or power during such imprisonment. But the Adult Authority may
restore to said person during his imprisonment such civil rights as the Author-
ity may deem proper, except the right to act as a trustee, or hold public
office or exercise the privilege of an elector or give a general power of at-
torney." See also CAL. PEN. COD- § 2601.
8 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1945).
9 E.g., In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 670, 361 P.2d 417, 420-21, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 753, 756-57 (1961); Snebold v. Justice Court, 201 Cal. App. 2d 152, 19
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1962).
1o In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 670, 361 P.2d 417, 420-21, 12 Cal. Rptr.
753, 756-57 (1961).
11 CAL. PFN. CODE §§ 2600-01.
12 Id.
13 CAL. PEN. CODE § 17 (defines felons as persons imprisoned in state
prisons).
14 Snebold v. Justice Court, 201 Cal. App. 2d 152, 19 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1962);
In re Robinson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 626, 246 P.2d 982 (1952). See also McCullom
v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112, 116 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
15 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 945.6(b).
16 For proper steps to be taken, see CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 900-35.6.
'7 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 844.6.
18 Cobey, The New California Governmental Tort Liability Statutes, 1
HARv. J. LEGis. 16, 19-20 (1964).
19 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2.
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Government Code creates such an immunity:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, except as pro-
vided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) of this section, a public entity
is not liable for:
(1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner.
(2) An injury to any prisoner.
Subdivision (a) creates an immunity that is intended to prevail over
all other provisions of the statute,20 with the exceptions as created
in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).
Subdivision (b) provides that:
Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under
Article 1 (commencing with section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division
9 of the Vehicle Code.
This exception specifically provides that the public entity will not
be immune from liability where death or injury to person or prop-
erty is proximately caused by the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by a public employee within the scope of his employment.
21
The exception created by this subdivision is necessary and vital to the
maintenance of the liability created by the Vehicle Code,2 2 due to the
broad interpretation given the word "law"23 in subdivision (a). "Law"
is interpreted as including both statutory enactments and the com-
mon law of the state as determined by the courts.2 4 Therefore, the
liability created by section 17001 of the Vehicle Code would be within
the purview of the immunity granted in section 844.6,25 if such liabil-
ity had not been expressly excluded.
Subdivision (d) provides that:
Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liabil-
ity for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act
or omission. The public entity may but is not required to pay any
judgment, compromise or settlement, or may but is not required to
indemnify any public employee, in any case where the public entity
is immune from liability under this section; except that the public
entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section
825) of Chapter 1 of this part, any judgment based on a claim against
a public employee licensed in one of the healing arts under Division
2 (commencing with Section 500) of the Business and Professions
Code for malpractice arising from an act or omission in the scope of
his employment, and shall pay any compromise or settlement of a
claim or action based on such malpractice to which the public entity
has agreed.
The effect of this subdivision is to exclude from the immunity the
liability for malpractice of a public employee licensed in one of the
healing arts. It serves to negate the immunity from such liability
20 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 844.6, Legislative Comm. Comment.
21 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17001 provides: "A public entity is liable for
death or injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or
wrongful act or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee
of the public entity acting within the scope of his employment."
22 Id.
23 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 811 provides: "'Law' includes not only enactments
but also the decisional law applicable within this State as determined and
declared from time to time by the courts of this State and of the United
States."
24 Id., Law Revision Comm'n Comment.
25 A. VAw ALsTwT_, GOvERNwiwTAL TORT LABan=rY 295-96 (Cal. Cont.
Educ. Bar, 1964).
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as would have been granted by subdivision (a) of section 844.6. This
subdivision also continues California law as it was before enactment
of the Tort Claims Act.
26
Subdivision (c) is taken up last due to its complexity and due
to the fact that it presents an interesting example of judicial inter-
pretation which to some extent avoids the effect of section 844.6.
Subdivision (c) provides:
Nothing in this section prevents a person, other than a prisoner,
from recovering from the public entity for an injury resulting from
the dangerous condition of public property under Chapter 2 (com-
mencing with Section 830) of this part.
The Dangerous Condition Exception
Dangerous Condition
There are two definitions which are important in determining the
scope of subdivision (c). The first is that of a dangerous condition.
It is essential to know the types of conditions that will give rise to
liability for injuries caused thereby. A dangerous condition on prop-
erty, as defined by statute, is one that creates a substantial risk of
injury when the property or adjacent property is used in a foreseeable
manner.27 The danger can be caused by a condition of either personal
or real property.28  However, neither the public entity nor its em-
ployee is responsible for a dangerous condition arising from natural
conditions of unimproved land.29
For there to be recovery under the "dangerous condition" ex-
ception, the plaintiff must prove that the injury was proximately
caused by the dangerous condition, and that it presented a foresee-
able risk of the kind of injury that occurred.30 And the plaintiff must
show that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the
condition with sufficient time to prevent injury or that the negli-
gence or wrongful act or omission of an employee within the scope
of his employment had caused the danger.3'
If any of the above statutory requirements are not met by the
plaintiff, the public entity will have a valid defense to a cause of
action brought under subdivision (c) of section 844.6. If all the re-
quirements have been met, there are still two possible statutory de-
fenses to such an action. Any act or omission that was "reasonable"
will not be grounds for liability, 2 and there will be no liability for
injury caused by a plan or design for construction or improvement
that has been properly approved. 8
20 Cal. Gov't Code § 2002.5, Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 1785, § 1, at 3294-95
(repealed 1963).
27 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 830(a); Pfeifer v. County of San Joaquin, 67 AC.
201, 430 P.2d 51, 60 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1967).
28 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830 (c).
29 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.2.
30 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.
81 Id.
32 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 835.4.
38 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6.
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Injury
The other definition important to the application of subdivision
(c) is that of the word "injury." This word has been broadly de-
fined to include such things as death, damage to property, and in-
jury to person, reputation or estate.3 4 The breadth of this definition
makes it clear that the public entity, barring an immunity, is to be
liable for the injuries to the kinds of interests that would be pro-
tected in actions between private citizens.
35
No distinction can be drawn between an individual's cause of
action for injury to his person and his action for the wrongful death
of another.36 Both injuries are personal to the plaintiff and are
normally protected. Professor Van Alstyne, in his work on govern-
mental tort liability, suggests that the legislature intended that there
be no distinction." He indicates that subdivision (c) of section 844.6
was carefully worded to avoid stipulating that the injury for which
recovery is sought could not stem from an accident involving a pris-
oner.38 The wrongful death action is not derivative39 and therefore
is not defeated by the prohibition of actions by prisoners. Thus, in
any of the injuries to a spouse, child or parent (loss of support, con-
sortium and others) 4 0 resulting from an injury to a prisoner, such
other person can recover if the injury is due to a dangerous condition
of the property. The change from the word "visitor," as subdivision
(c) was originally proposed, to the word "person,"41 as finally en-
acted, indicates that this is the correct interpretation. This change
in wording broadens the exception to the immunity, thus permit-
ting the inclusion of a wrongful death action, even though the plain-
tiff was not on or near the public entity property at the time of the
death.
An example of the application of subdivision (c) of section
844.6 is Garcia v. State.42 Garcia was incarcerated in the state prison
at Tehachapi. He was killed when a negligently maintained weight
suspension rack collapsed upon him. Had Garcia lived, subdivision
34 CAL. GoV'T CODE § 810.8 provides: "'Injury' means death, injury to
a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person
may suffer to his person, reputation, character, feelings or estate, of such
nature that it would be actionable if inflicted by a private person."
35 Id., Law Revision Comm'n Comment.
36 Flournoy v. State, 57 Cal. 2d 497, 370 P.2d 331, 20 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1962);
Ziegler v. Santa Cruz High School Dist., 168 Cal. App. 2d 277, 335 P.2d 709
(1959); Wilson v. City & County of San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 2d 440, 235
P.2d 81 (1951); Hanson v. Reedley etc. School Dist., 43 Cal. App. 2d 643, 111
P.2d 415 (1941). But see Sanders v. County of Yuba, 247 A.C.A. 875, 878 n.1,
55 Cal. Rptr. 852, 854 n.1 (1967).
37 A. VAN ALsTrNE, supra note 25, at 296.
88 Id.
39 2 B. Wrinr, Sum1mARY OF CALIFoRNIA LAW Torts § 374, at 1977 (7th
ed. 1960).
40 W. PROSsEs, TORTS § 119, at 918-19 (3d ed. 1964).
41 "Visitor" is used in section 844.6(c) as originally included in the Act
(March 19, 1963) and as reincluded in the Act (April 22, 1963) before ap-
proval by the Senate. 1963 JomuRAL OF THE SENATE 903, 1782. "Visitor" was
changed to "Person" as section 844.6 was reincluded in the Act in the Assem-
bly (June 15, 1963). 1963 JouAL OF THE AssEmBLY 5487.
42 247 A.C.A. 950, 56 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1967).
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(a) of section 844.6 would have prevented him from recovering for
his injuries. However, in the wrongful death action by his widow
and child, recovery was permitted.43 Injury from a dangerous con-
dition of public property was interpreted as including wrongful
death.
The Exception for the Negligent Failure to
Furnish Medical Care
A fourth exception to section 844.6 has been added by the Cali-
fornia courts through their interpretation of legislative intent in the
enactment of sections 844.6 and 845.6. 44 Section 845.6 creates a duty
to provide medical care:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury
proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or
obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as
otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, and
the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of
his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to
know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he
fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.
Section 845.6 is one of the sections 45 creating liability that seems
to be excluded by the statutory language:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, except as provided
in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) of this section, a public entity is not
liable for:
(2) An injury to any prisoner.4 6
However, this is not the interpretation applied by the courts. Two
courts have agreed that sections 844.6 and 845.6 should be reconciled,
but they were apparently unable to agree on a method of reconcilia-
tion.
Sanders v. County of Yuba
47
In Sanders, the action was based on a negligent failure to pro-
vide medical care. Sanders, a prisoner, injured his eye on a towel
rack. Subsequently, he lost all vision in that eye due to the jailer's
failure to provide medical care. The court found that he had stated
a cause of action based on section 845.6 and that the suit was not
prevented by section 844.6 as had been found by the trial court.48
In reconciling sections 844.6 and 845.6, the court described the "put
and take"49 process of these sections as the bill 50 passed through the
legislature. Briefly, the history of the two sections is that section
844.6 was not in the Tort Claims Act as originally proposed in the
43 Id. at 953, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
44 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.6.
45 For other excluded sections, see A. VAN ALsTyxE, supra note 25, at 598,
609.
46 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 844.6 (a) (emphasis added).
47 247 A.C.A. 875, 55 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1967).
48 Id. at 882, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
49 Id. at 880, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
50 S.B. 42 (1963).
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Senate, nor was the clause creating the duty in section 845.6. 51 After
section 844.6 had been included, it was excluded on April 3, 1963, the
same day that section 845.6 was amended to include the duty to fur-
nish medical care. From then on, section 845.6 remained unchanged
while section 844.6 was again included in the Act before it passed the
Senate. In the Assembly, section 844.6 was again excluded and then
reinstated before final passage.
52
From this history, the court concluded that it was difficult to
rationalize an intent to repeal section 845.6 by the enactment of sec-
tion 844.6.53 Instead, the court based its harmonization on the fact
that section 845.6 was strengthened while section 844.6 was being
added and deleted. The Sanders court also accommodated the sec-
tions by relying on a distinction between physical impact injuries
and non-physical impact injuries.
54
The court's reconciliation based on the history of sections 844.6
and 845.6 is not supported by any rule of construction. The court
admits that these rules are defeated by the "notwithstanding" clause of
section 844.6. 55 And, while a reviewing court may rely on legislative
history to show legislative intent,56 the conclusions drawn by the
Sanders court do not logically flow from the history of the two sec-
tions involved. The fact that section 844.6 was included later than
section 845.6 leads to the inference that the legislature was aware of
section 845.6. 57 And, since the legislators were aware of section 845.6,
they may be presumed to have intended to include it within the scope
of the immunity, as it was not specifically excepted. This interpre-
tation is consistent with the Legislative Committee Comment to sec-
tion 844.6, 58 indicating that this section is to prevail over all other
provisions of law. Professor Van Alstyne,5 9 one of the principal
authors 0 of the Tort Claims Act and a recognized authority on Cali-
fornia governmental tort liability and immunity,6' concurs with the
assertion that section 844.6 was to prevail over all inconsistent sec-
tions of the Act.
62
The court's reconciliation based on a distinction between physi-
cal impact, and non-physical impact injuries is also refutable. It is
refuted by reference to the broad definition of injury used in the
51 S.B. 42 (1963) (this bill followed recommendations in 5 CAL. LAW
REVISION COmm'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES (1963)).
52 For complete history of S.B. 42, see 1963 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE and
1963 JOURNAL OF THE AssEMBLy.
53 247 A.C.A. at 880, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
54 Id. at 881, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
55 Id. at 880-81, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56.
56 See Rich v. State Bd. of Optometry, 235 Cal. App. 2d 591, 603, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 512, 519-20 (1965).
57 Garcia v. State, 247 A.C.A. 950, 56 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1967).
58 1963 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 1893; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 844.6, Legislative
Comm. Comment.
59 Author of Governmental Tort Liability, note 25 supra.
60 Sanders v. County of Yuba, 247 A.C.A. 875, 878 n.1, 55 Cal. Rptr. 852,
854 n.1 (1967).
61 See Cabell v. State, 67 A.C. 174, 185-86, 430 P.2d 34, 42, 60 Cal. Rptr.
476, 484 (1967) (dissent of Justice Peters referring to Professor Van Alstyne).
62 A. VAN ALSTym, supra note 25 at 598-99.
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Tort Claims Act.63 The definition makes it clear that "injury" in-
cludes both physical impact injuries and non-physical impact injur-
ies, as both would.be compensable in an action between private per-
sons. Therefore, both grounds of reconciliation suggested by the
Sanders court fail to comply with legislative intent, leaving the court's
harmonization of sections 844.6 and 845.6 tenuous at best.
Hart v. County of Orange
6 4
The heirs of Hart brought a wrongful death action based on a
negligent failure to provide medical care under section 845.6. Hart
was brought in "too drunk to book" and was placed in a drunk tank.
The next morning he was taken to the hospital. The medical care
that he finally received was too late to prevent his death.65 The court
held that the employees of the public entity had been negligent in
not obtaining medical care for Hart.6 6
In support of its decision, the court agreed with the result in
Sanders, which interprets section 844.6 to say "a public entity shall
not be liable for an injury to any prisoner except as provided under
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) of this section and as hereinafter pro-
vided in section 845.6. ' ' 67 However, this court based its reconcilia-
tion of the two sections on a more tenable ground. The court in
Hart relied on a distinction between the subject matter of the two
sections.68 It said that section 845.6 deals with the creation of a liabil-
ity, rather than with the creation of an immunity as in section 844.6.69
The court contended that section 845.6 creates a duty, the breach of
which is not an injury within the meaning of the word as used in the
Tort Claims Act.7 0 The distinction is based on the fact that a breach
of the duty created in section 845.6 would not give rise to a cause of
action between private persons, and therefore is not within the mean-
ing of the word "injury."71
The court's distinction seems credible. However, even if this
distinction is conceded, the court's reconciliation is not irrefutable.
The distinction would be valid grounds for reconciling the two sec-
tions except for one factor. The legislative intent behind the enact-
ment of section 844.6 was that it should supersede all other liability-
creating sections of the Tort Claims Act.72 This intent was emphasized
in the discussion of Sanders73 and applies with equal force to this case.
The courts in both cases seem determined to ignore the intent of
the legislature in enacting section 844.6. The courts apparently look
with disfavor upon the immunity and seek to avoid its application.
A primary reason for the disfavor would appear to be that the public
63 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810.8.
64 254 A.C.A. 335, 62 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1967).
65 Id. at 336, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
66 Id. at 341, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
67 247 A.C.A. at 881, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
68 254 A.C.A. at 339, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 810.8.
72 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 844.6, Legislative Comm. Comment.
73 See text accompanying notes 55-63 supra.
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convenience is no longer thought to outweigh individual compensa-
tion.7 4 The feeling seems to be that the public entities should pay
for injuries which they have caused. Another reason that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is looked upon with disfavor is that it has
been so eroded by statutory exceptions that it operates illogically,
causing serious inequalities. 6 In addition, the immunity prevents
respondeat superior from being applied to public entities, 76 with
respect to the maintenance and operation of their prisons.
Does California Need Seciion 844.6?
The immunity granted to public entities by this section appears
to have been included in the Tort Claims Act for two reasons. The
first, and probably the most important, was the fear that the exclu-
sion of the immunity would lead to many negligence suits with
large judgments against public entities.7 7 A second reason appears to
have been the expectancy of problems in the maintenance of prison
discipline if suits by prisoners against public entities were to be
permitted.
78
The experience of the federal government, which permits suit
by prisoners,79 has shown that the expectations of frivolous suits
and the resultant damage to prison administration and discipline
have failed to materialize.8 0 Likewise, the fear of a higher cost of
operation if prisoners are permitted to recover from public entities
has also been shown to be unmerited. The California Senate Fact
Finding Committee on Judiciary issued a report"' which should have
illustrated to the legislature that the fear of prohibitive cost was
groundless. New York had 486 tort claims filed against it in 1959, of
which only 10 arose in the penal system.8 2 Of the 10, 6 were dis-
missed and the one in which recovery was allowed resulted in a ver-
dict of only $15,015.83 Illinois, on the other hand, had a somewhat
higher percentage of claims arising out of its penal system,8 4 but dur-
74 See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 217, 359 P.2d 457,
459, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91 (1961).
75 Id. at 216, 359 P.2d at 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
76 Morris, The Disappearing Doctrine of Governmental Immunity from
Tort Liability, 26 GA. B.J. 435 (1965); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort
Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 UNIv. ILL. L.F. 919.
77 The fact that section 844.6 was included at the last minute by the
Senate Finance Committee would indicate that the fear of many negligence
suits was an important consideration in its inclusion in the Act. 1963 JOURNAL
OF THE SENATE 1893. California cases support this view. See Hart v. County
of Orange, 254 A.C.A. 335, 339, 62 Cal. Rptr. 73, 77 (1967); Reed v. City &
County of San Francisco, 237 Cal. App. 2d 23, 25, 46 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (1965).
78 Cf. Muniz v. United States, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Tubor v. Hardwick,
224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955). See also Reed v. City & County of San
Francisco, 237 Cal. App. 2d 23, 46 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1965).
79 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
80 Muniz v. United States, 374 U.S. 150, 162-63 (1963).
81 Governmental Tort Liability, 1963 SuPP. TO THE APPENDIX OF THE
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE.
82 Id. at 76-78.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 81-95 (27 of 168 tort claims arose therein).
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ing the period from 1950 to 1960, the total award of damages was only
about $13,000.85
Another factor to be considered in determining the need for the
immunity granted in section 844.6 is the possible liability of public
entities if section 844.6 had not been enacted. Prisoners would be
able to recover from the public entity for the negligence of its em-
ployees,8 6 as well as against the employee himself.*87 However,
neither the public entity nor its employee would be made liable for
an injury to a prisoner caused by another prisoner. Prior case law pre-
vents this,88 as does the California Tort Claims Act.8 9
In addition, in the absence of section 844.6, the liabilities that
were excepted from the immunity would still exist. Each subdivision
is a part of California statutory law independent of section 844.6.
Subdivision (b), as was pointed out previously,90 is merely a codifi-
cation of the liability created by the Vehicle Code.9 ' Subdivision (c)
continues the law as it was before the Tort Claims Act was enacted,
92
and is codified elsewhere within the Act9 3 And, subdivision (d), as
was also pointed out,94 likewise continues prior law95 and is incorpo-
rated elsewhere into the Act.9 6
Conclusion
Subdivision (a), which creates the public entity immunity from
suit by prisoners, is the only part of section 844.6 which enacts statu-
tory law that is not enacted elsewhere. Two of the principal reasons
for the enactment of this part of section 844.6-cost and damage to
prison discipline and administration-are not the problems that they
were thought to be. Therefore, the implications of the maneuvering
of the courts to avoid application of section 844.6 deserve serious
consideration.
If the legislature intended to make the public entities absolutely
immune from liability for accidents involving prisoners, in spite of
the objections expressed by the courts, further legislation is needed.
The loophole permitting recovery by third parties for injuries aris-
ing out of accidents involving prisoners must be closed. Additionally,
further legislation is necessary to make it clear to the courts that
85 Id. at 81-95.
86 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2(a).
87 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.
88 Grove v. County of San Joaquin, 156 Cal. App. 2d 808, 320 P.2d 161
(1958); Bryant v. County of Monterey, 125 Cal. App. 2d 470, 270 P.2d 897
(1954).
89 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.8 (employee); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2(b)
(public entity).
90 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
91 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17001.
92 Cal. Gov't Code § 53051, Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 81, § 1, at 285 (repealed
1963).
93 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 835-35.4.
94 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
95 Cal. Gov't Code § 2002.5, Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 1785, § 1, at 3294 (re-
pealed 1963).
96 CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 825-25.6.
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section 844.6 is not to be reconciled with section 845.6 or any other
section.
However, if sovereign immunity is a disfavored doctrine and is
ceasing to be accepted in the United States, 97 the above corrections
probably will not prevent judicial maneuvering to avoid the effect
of section 844.6. The courts will continually seek new ways to avoid
the immunity created. Therefore, the best solution would be to rec-
ognize that the fears which led to the enactment of section 844.6
were without merit. This would permit the repeal of the section
and would bring California in line with New York and the federal
government9 9 on the issue of suit by prisoners.
Repeal of section 844.6 would permit the enforcement of the
duty created in section 845.6, without the present difficulties. The
courts and the legislature seem to agree that a jailer should be
required to provide medical services for a prisoner when there is
actual or constructive notice that the prisoner is in need of immediate
medical care. 00 The fact that the legislature later saw fit to super-
sede the liability does not indicate that the duty was thought to be
inappropriate, if monetarily feasible. Such a liability would serve to
solidify the moral obligation of common decency to come to the aid
of another human being who is in danger.' 0 But, more importantly,
a repeal of section 844.6 would permit the doctrine of respondeat
superior 0 2 to be applied to public entities which provide and main-
tain prison facilities. Such an application of the doctrine would re-
quire the public entities to assume more responsibility in selecting,
training and supervising their employees. This increased care might
well eliminate many of the injuries giving rise to the actions from
which the public entity is made immune by section 844.6.
Richard T. Bowles*
97 The federal government, New York, Illinois, Alaska, Hawaii, Ken-
tucky, North Carolina, Washington, Arizona, Florida, Connecticut, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nevada, Louisiana, and Utah have all made some move
to do away with sovereign immunity. See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort
Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 Umv. ILL. L.F. 919; Morris, The Disap-
pearing Doctrine of Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability, 26 GA. B.J.
435, 440 (1964); Governmental Tort Liability, 1963 SuPP. TO THE APPENDIX TO
TE JouRNAL OF THE SENATE 24-28.
98 Paige v. State, 269 N.Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617 (1935).
99 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
100 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.6, Law Revision Commn Comment.
101 W. Piossa_, ToRTs § 54, at 337-38 (3d ed. 1964).
102 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815. See generally CAL. Civ. CODE § 2338.
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